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Abstract 
  In this paper, the ethical and spiritual aspects of the trolley problem are discussed in connection with 
the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. First, I show that the dropping of atomic 
bombs was a typical example of the events that contained the logic of the trolley problems in their 
decision-making processes and justifications. Second, I discuss five aspects of “the problem of the 
trolley problem;” that is to say, “Rarity,” “Inevitability,” “Safety Zone,” “Possibility of Becoming a 
Victim,” and “Lack of Perspective of the Dead Victims Who Were Deprived of Freedom of Choice,” 
in detail. Third, I argue that those who talk about the trolley problem are automatically placed in the 
sphere of the expectation of response on the spiritual level. I hope that my contribution will shed light 
on the trolley problem from a very different angle, which has not been made by our fellow 
philosophers. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Brian Short writes a concise explanation of a standard type of the trolley 
problem in a recent issue of the LSA Magazine. 
 
You’re standing next to a train track when you spot a locomotive 
approaching. Farther down the track are five people in the path of the train 
but too far away for you to shout a warning to them. A lever next to you 
would allow you to divert the train – saving the lives of five people – onto 
a track with only one person standing on it. If you knew that one person 
would die if you flipped the lever, would you still do it?”1 
 
The possibility of your choice is only two: Do nothing and let the trolley run five 
people over, or divert the trolley and let it run one person over. 
The trolley problem was first introduced by Philippa Foot in her paper, “The 
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Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect,” published in 1967, 
and it has been further developed by Judith Jarvis Thomson and other 
philosophers up until the present day.  
However, it is worth noticing that the original logic inherent in the trolley 
problem had already appeared twenty years before Philippa Foot’s paper. That is 
to say, we can find almost the same logic in the 1947 article, “The Decision to 
Use the Atomic Bomb,” by Henry Lewis Stimson, who served as US Secretary of 
War during World War II. 
 
2. The Dropping of Atomic Bombs 
 
In his article, Stimson recalls his and his colleagues’ decision-making process 
concerning the use of atomic bombs at the final stage of the Pacific War. Stimson 
was very pessimistic about the surrender of the Japanese government. He writes 
this: 
 
We estimated that if we should be forced to carry this plan to its conclusion, 
the major fighting would not end until the latter part of 1946, at the earliest. 
I was informed that such operations might be expected to cost over a million 
casualties, to American forces alone. Additional large losses might be 
expected among our allies, and, of course, if our campaign were successful 
and if we could judge by previous experience, enemy casualties would be 
much larger than our own.2 
 
He decides to use an atomic bomb and end the war. He thinks that an atomic bomb 
gives an effective shock to his enemy. He writes: 
 
Such an effective shock would save many times the number of lives, both 
Americans and Japanese, that it would cost.3 
 
This is the main logic of his decision to drop an atomic bomb on Hiroshima. He 
believes that without the atomic bomb the number of American and Japanese 
casualties would have become enormously larger. 
 
                                                     
2 Stimson (1947), p.102. 
3 Stimson (1947), p.101. 
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Had the war continued until the projected invasion on November 1, 
additional fire raids of B-20’s would have been more destructive of life and 
property than the very limited number of atomic raids which we could have 
executed in the same period.4 
 
Stimson thinks that if America does nothing special and continues its conventional 
battles, a huge number of American and Japanese soldiers’ lives will be lost; 
however, if America uses an atomic bomb, the loss of lives will become much 
smaller. This is exactly the same logic as found in the trolley problem.5 
This was the case not only for the Japanese, but for the US soldiers at the 
frontline who were then waiting for landing operations on the main islands of 
Japan. If the experiment of the atomic bomb had been unsuccessful, the soldiers 
at the frontline would have had to land on and continue disparate battles against 
the enemy fully prepared to die. Paul Fussell was one of those soldiers. He writes 
in his provocative and moving article entitled, “Thank God for the Atom Bomb,” 
as follows: 
 
When the atom bombs were dropped and news began to circulate that 
“Operation Olympic” would not, after all, be necessary, when we learned 
                                                     
4 Stimson (1947), p.105. 
5 I have always wondered why there are so few English language articles that discuss the dropping of 
atomic bombs as a typical example of the trolley problem. Phil Badger talks about atomic bombs in 
“How to Get Off Our Trolleys,” but he only discusses the outward similarities between them (Badger 
[2011]). In the book The Trolley Problem or Would You Throw the Fat Guy Off the Bridge?, the author 
Thomas Cathcart mentions atomic bombs on page 110, but he gives only eight lines to this topic 
(Cathcart [2013], p.110). In the book Would You Kill the Fat Man?: The Trolley Problem and What 
Your Answer Tells Us about Right and Wrong, David Edmonds mentions Elizabeth Anscombe’s anger 
when hearing that Oxford University was to give an honorary degree to Harry S. Truman, who decided 
to drop atomic bombs on the two cities (Edmonds [2014], pp.22-25. See also Anscombe [1957]); 
however, Edmonds does not give any detailed discussions about the relationship between the trolley 
problem and atomic bombs. 
In this connection, it is worthy of attention that in her 1976 paper, “Killing, Letting Die, and the 
Trolley Problem,” Judith Jarvis Thomson proposes two imaginary cases in which Russians launch an 
atom bomb towards New York. In the first case, the president of the United States, whose name is 
Harry (the same as Truman), deflects that atom bomb toward Worcester. In the second case, the 
president, whose name is Irving, drops an American atom bomb on Worcester and pulverizes the 
Russian one by its blast. Thomson suggests that these two cases share a similar logic that is found in 
the trolley problem (Thomson [1976], p.208). Here Thomson hints that these two imaginary cases 
have some connection with Hiroshima or Nagasaki by naming one of the presidents “Harry,” however, 
she never directly mentions these two Japanese cities so as not to be entangled with a provocative 
ethical debate on the dropping of atomic bombs in World War II. James M. Fisher and Mark Ravizza 
discuss Thomson’s 1976 paper and stress the horribleness of the launching of an atomic bomb, but do 
not mention Hiroshima or Nagasaki in their paper (Fisher and Ravizza [1992], pp.68-69). 
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to our astonishment that we would not be obliged in a few months to rush 
up the beaches near Tokyo assault-firing while being machine-gunned, 
mortared, and shelled, for all the practiced phlegm of our tough facades we 
broke down and cried with relief and joy. We were going to live. We were 
going to grow to adulthood after all.6 
 
Fussell was also inside the trolley problem at the time. He was among the five 
workers on the train track. He saw a trolley rushing down on him and suddenly 
the trolley was diverted and he was saved by a hair’s breadth. For Fussell, the 
trolley problem was an actual situation he faced. 
So, what happened to the other one person on the train track? Fussell refers 
to the destiny of his enemy on the Japanese soil in a straightforward manner. He 
quotes from the survivors’ writings of their testimonies such as “[w]hile taking 
my severely wounded wife out to the river bank …, I was horrified indeed at the 
sight of a stark naked man standing in the rain with his eyeball in his palm.”7 
Fussell writes about the drawings made by atomic bombs survivors: 
 
These childlike drawings and paintings are of skin hanging down, breasts 
torn off, people bleeding and burning, dying mothers nursing dead babies. 
A bloody woman holds a bloody child in the ruins of a house, and the artist 
remembers her calling, “Please help this child! Someone, please help this 
child. Please help! Someone, please.”8 
 
When I read articles or hear presentations on the trolley problem, such stories 
described above come to my mind all at once and overwhelm me. 
Every year I give a talk about the trolley problem in my college class and ask 
the students what they would do if they were out there and only two choices were 
available to them. The majority of them reply to me that they would save five 
people by diverting the trolley to the other track. Then, I talk about the dropping 
of atomic bombs on Japanese cities in the summer of 1945, and point out that the 
                                                     
6 Fussell (1981), p.14. 
7 Fussell (1981), p.18. 
8 Fussell (1981), p.19. See also Wingfield-Hayes (2015). In the article entitled, “A Tricycle, a Toddler 
and an Atomic Bomb,” on the CNN website, you can see a burned tricycle for toddlers found in 
Hiroshima city. <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/08/05/world/hiroshima-survivors-artifacts/> (Visited 
August 15, 2016). You can also see the photo of a woman carrying a burnt-to-black baby in her arms 
on the NHK website. <http://www.nhk.or.jp/special/detail/2015/0806/> (Visited August 15, 2016). 
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decision to divert the trolley, which the majority of the students chose, shares the 
same logic as the US government’s decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki that killed more than 200,000 Japanese people including civilians. 
They are shocked to hear my argument and for the first time start to rethink 
seriously the meaning of the trolley problem. Most Japanese do not think atomic 
bombs were necessary to end the war, or that the dropping of atomic bombs is 
morally justified to save the lives of American and Japanese people that would 
have been lost without them. Since the students also share that sentiment, the fact 
that they behaved like the US government when faced with the trolley problem 
places a heavy moral dilemma on their shoulders. Young students here learn the 
story of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at least once in their elementary or junior high 
school days. At the time of the bombing on August 6 and 9, people in the Japanese 
islands offer silent prayers for the victims of the atomic bombs. For the Japanese, 
the dropping of atomic bombs is a symbol of peace and prayer. During these two 
days, many Japanese people yearn for peace, non-killing, and non-violence.  
 
3. The Problem of the Trolley Problem 
 
Before going on to our analysis of the ethical dimension of the trolley problem, 
let us first examine whether the dropping of an atomic bomb on Hiroshima is 
really an appropriate example for discussing the trolley problem. Looking back 
on history, we could say that there was a third alternative for the allied forces, that 
is, withdrawing the army from the front line and seeing how the Japanese 
government would react to it, while continuing tough diplomatic negotiations 
with them. This choice was possible because the Japanese army was almost 
beginning to collapse after the battle of Okinawa, and Japan would have had no 
other way but to surrender even if the allied forces had not done anything to the 
Japanese mainland. If this is true, this means that the trolley’s brake was not 
actually broken. If the allied forces had stopped fighting, the Japanese army might 
have fought them back using their remaining aircraft and warships. This means 
that the Japanese army was not actually bound to the track.  
Of course, there are historians who doubt a third possibility of this kind. For 
example, Francis Winters, following Barton Bernstein and other scholars’ 
discussions, argues that if the allied forces had continued conventional bombings 
and a blockade of Japanese ports, and had sent the message that the role of the 
emperor would be unchanged in post-war Japanese society, the dropping of 
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atomic bombs would not have been necessary; however, in that case, we would 
have witnessed the army of Soviet Union entering the mainland of Japan instead, 
which was not good news for Truman. 9  The actual situation was far more 
complicated than the standard trolley problem cases. 
Considering all these things, it can be concluded that the historical event of 
dropping atomic bombs itself should not be regarded as the event that literally 
embodied the trolley problem. However, at the same time, we can say that the 
decision of dropping the bombs was made according to the way of thinking 
inherent in the logic of the trolley problem, and hence, in this sense, the historical 
event of dropping atomic bombs contained the logic of the trolley problem in its 
decision-making process. We should clearly distinguish between these two 
concepts. Hiroshima is considered to be an appropriate example of the trolley 
problem in the latter context. 
The way of thinking inherent in the logic of the trolley problem was 
crystalized in Stimson’s type of justification of atomic bombs. The possibility is 
either landing or atomic bombs. The advancement of the allied forces toward the 
Japanese mainland was taken for granted. The brake of the allied forces was 
completely broken. The lever was in the hands of Stimson and Truman, who were 
sitting in the safety zone far from the Far East.  
The trolley problem in which a bystander pulls the lever was invented by 
Thomson in her article, “Trolley Problem,” published in 1985. Interestingly, in 
the original trolley case proposed by Foot in 1967, the person who pulls the lever 
is not a “bystander,” but the “driver” of the trolley. Thomson sees a sharp 
difference between these two cases. She says, “[T]he trolley driver is, after all, 
captain of the trolley. He is charged by the trolley company with responsibility for 
the safety of his passengers and anyone else who might be harmed by the trolley 
he drives. The bystander at the switch, on the other hand, is a private person who 
just happens to be there.”10 According to Thomson, the driver is responsible for 
the people who might be harmed, but a bystander does not have such 
responsibility.11 In the atomic bomb case, Stimson and Truman were considered 
to be the persons who should take responsibility of the people who might be 
harmed by the then ongoing war. Hence, Stimson’s type of justification of the 
                                                     
9 Winters (2009), pp.182-192. 
10 Thomson (1985), p.1397. 
11 At the same time, Thomson argues that it is permissible for a bystander to take responsibility 
(p.1398). 
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dropping of atomic bombs should be regarded as a “driver” version of the trolley 
problem. 
Hence, my conclusion is that the dropping of atomic bombs was a typical 
example of the events that contained the logic of the trolley problems both in their 
decision-making processes and justifications 
Reading articles and books on the trolley problem from the perspective of the 
dropping of atomic bombs, I have gradually realized that the discussions of the 
trolley problem share a series of fundamental problems, which I call “the problem 
of the trolley problem.” This problem has five aspects. Let us examine them one 
by one.12 
 
The First Aspect: “Rarity” 
The first aspect is that the trolley problem is often considered to be a rarely 
occurring problem although in reality there have been many events in human 
history that contained the logic of trolley problem in their decision-making 
processes.  
In the paper, “Revisiting External Validity: Concerns about Trolley Problems 
and Other Sacrificial Dilemmas in Moral Psychology,” Christopher W. Bauman 
et al. write as follows: 
 
In sum, philosophers developed trolley problems as rhetorical devices that 
could help them articulate the implications of moral principles in concrete, 
albeit highly unusual, situations. Although others have criticized the use of 
trolley problems in philosophy (e.g., Hare, 1981; Pincoffs, 1986; Singer, 
1999), our purpose is to point out the potential limitations of using such 
unrealistic scenarios in empirical science.13 
 
They seem to think that the trolley problem is a rhetorical device invented in a 
highly unusual situation, but their presentation sounds fairly misleading. We have 
to distinguish between following four notions: the logic of the trolley problem, 
the event that literally embodies that logic, the event that contains that logic in its 
                                                     
12 When hearing the trolley problem, what comes to our minds first is that in this thought experiment 
the information about the victims’ names, gender, ages, and their relationships to us are all missing. 
This characteristic of “anonymity” is certainly an important feature of the trolley problem; however, 
this is shared with many other thought experiments in philosophy, not peculiar to the trolley problem. 
Thus, I do not include it in the list of the problem of the trolley problem. 
13 Bauman et al. (2014), p.539. 
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decision-making process, and the discourse that depicts that logic. It is of course 
possible that five people are actually bound to the track and one person to the 
other track and the brakes of a running trolley are broken, but this is surely a 
highly rare scenario as Bauman et al. correctly point out. However, as we can 
easily imagine, there have been many historical events that contained that logic in 
their decision-making processes, especially in the time of war, and there must be 
other small size events or incidents that contain the logic similar to that of the 
trolley problem in our society, such as the case of a rushing car with broken brakes 
into a group of pedestrians, in which if the driver turns left or right a very small 
number of pedestrians are to be run over (or the recent question of whether a self-
driving car’s artificial intelligence should be equipped with the ability to make 
moral decisions in such a situation may be a better example of this). The command 
of Kamikaze suicidal attacks or the command of the work of extinguishment 
inside a blasted nuclear power plant might be another example. Thus, it is 
paralogism to think that because the events that literally embody the trolley 
problem rarely occur, the events that contain the logic of the trolley problem in 
their decision-making processes rarely occur. 
Barbara H. Fried expresses the same point as this: “[T]he trolley literature has 
inadvertently led both authors and consumers of that literature to regard tragic 
choices themselves as rarely occurring and freakish in nature. But they are neither 
of these things. They are ubiquitous and for the most part quotidian ….”14 
Although the logic of the trolley problem can be found in many historical 
events and in our current society, we are often inclined to think that because the 
trolley problem is based on a highly unrealistic scenario, we rarely encounter it in 
the real world, with the exception of armchair philosophers’ thought experiments. 
This is the first aspect of the problem of the trolley problem. 
 
The Second Aspect: “Inevitability” 
In the standard trolley problem, it is strongly postulated that the brakes of a 
running trolley are broken and we do not have any means to stop the trolley before 
it runs over people on the track. The choices left to us are only two: to pull the 
lever and kill one person, or to do nothing to let five people die. However, when 
it is applied to actual events, this way of thinking sometimes leads to a problematic 
result.  
                                                     
14 Fried (2012), p.7. Italics by Fried. 
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For instance, Stimson’s interpretation, which is a typical example of the 
trolley problem, took it for granted that the advancement of the then ongoing war 
was inevitable and there were no other ways but to either land on the main islands 
or drop an atomic bomb. However, in reality, as I discussed earlier, there might 
have been a third alternative—that the US withdraw their forces from the frontline 
and wait for the surrender of the Japanese government, no matter how small that 
possibility would have been. Hence, we must say that Stimson’s interpretation 
worked as a device to turn our eyes away from this third possibility and to make 
us believe that there were actually only two choices, landing or dropping. 
Once we look at actual social events from the perspective of the trolley 
problem, we are naturally inclined to think that it is utterly impossible for us to 
stop the running trolley no matter what measures we would take, and the idea that 
we might still be able to stop the trolley in some way gradually disappears from 
our consciousness. This is the second aspect of the problem. 
Allen Wood explains the same point in a different manner. The trolley 
problem cuts out various important factors from a given situation and tries to 
narrow its scope; however, in the real world, those discarded factors can play a 
decisive role when making a difficult decision. Wood argues that “[i]n the process, 
an important range of considerations that are, should be, and in real life would be 
absolutely decisive in our moral thinking about these cases in the real world is 
systematically abstracted out. The philosophical consequences of doing this seem 
to me utterly disastrous, and to render trolley problems far worse than useless for 
moral philosophy.”15  
 
The Third Aspect: “Safety Zone” 
In the trolley problem it is usually supposed that we are standing next to the 
track or driving inside the trolley, completely protected from what is to occur on 
the tracks. We are inside a safety zone. Those who are going to be killed are the 
people on the tracks, not us. While being protected inside a safety zone, we are 
discussing who should be saved, or killed—people on the right track, or people 
on the left track. 
In the case of atomic bombs, the top commanders (Stimson, Truman, and 
others) were discussing whether or not to drop them inside a safety zone, located 
far from the battle field, where their lives were completely protected from direct, 
                                                     
15 Wood (2011), p.70. He concludes that the principle of human dignity “may give us reasons [for] 
refusing to look at the world in the way trolley problems tend to induce us to look at it” (p.80). 
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lethal effects caused by the landing or the dropping of atomic bombs. The third 
aspect of the problem is that the lives of people who discuss the trolley problem 
are protected inside a safety zone and that they can discuss it without being 
bothered by the possibility that their lives might be threatened by an actual trolley. 
Of course, this is a characteristic found not only in the trolley problem. Many 
other ethical dilemmas also share this problem. But I want to stress this aspect 
here because sometimes we tend to forget the fact that we are situated in a 
privileged position when thinking about this kind of armchair thought experiment. 
At the same time, we have to pay special attention to the trolley problems in 
which the life of the person who decides whether or not to pull the lever is to be 
taken away as the result of her own decision making. Let us take an example from 
Thomson’s 2008 paper.  
In this paper, Thomson proposes two new variations of the trolley problem, 
namely, the “Bystander’s Three Options” case and the “Driver’s Three Options” 
case. In the Bystander’s Three Options case, when the bystander does nothing five 
people die, when he throw the switch to the right one person dies, and when he 
throw the switch to the left the trolley kills himself standing on the left track. 
Similarly, in the Driver’s Three Options case, when the driver does nothing five 
people die, when he turns it to the right one person dies, and when he turns it to 
the left the trolley crashes onto a stone wall and he dies.16  
In both cases, the person who decides whether or not to turn the trolley is 
under threat to be killed by his own decision making, and hence in this sense, the 
person is not considered to be located in a safety zone. He is not in a privileged 
position anymore. His life can be taken away. Thus, the third aspect of the problem 
does not seem to exist here. 
However, I want to add an important point. In the above two cases, while the 
person who decides the direction of the trolley is not located in a safety zone, the 
person who proposes these cases, namely Judith Jarvis Thomson herself, is still 
located in a safety zone, and the same thing holds true with those who discuss 
Thomson’s variations, including the reader, you, and the author of this paper, me. 
Almost all of us who are now thinking about Thomson’s cases in which the person 
deciding the direction of the trolley is not located in a safety zone are actually 
located in a safety zone. In most cases, professors or students who are discussing 
the life of the bystander or the driver who is not in a safety zone are in fact within 
                                                     
16 Thomson (2008), pp.364, 369. 
 326
a safety zone and protected from the threat the trolley might cause to them. 
Furthermore, most of us usually forget the fact that we are in a safety zone and 
protected from dangers even when we are seriously thinking about a person who 
is under threat outside a safety zone.  
Let us take another example from moral psychology. In 2008 and 2009, Bryce 
Huebner and Marc D. Hauser conducted questionnaire research on “altruistic self-
sacrifice,” using Thomson’s trilemma case, through the Moral Sense Test website. 
They presented two scenarios to participants. In the first scenario, a bystander, 
whose name is Jesse, is at the switch point. A voluntary participant was asked 
what Jesse should do in the situation. In the second scenario, instead, a voluntary 
participant herself “was asked what she or he should do rather than being asked 
what Jesse should do.” 17  The participant has to answer with what her own 
decision would be if she were at the switch point, and if she turns the switch to 
the left it means that the trolley rushes to kill her. Hence, in the second scenario, 
it might seem that the participant is under threat and put outside a safety zone, but 
this is not the case. It is no doubt clear that the participant continues to stay inside 
a safety zone because she is never under threat to be killed by the rushing trolley 
in her actual situation looking at a computer screen on her desk. Jesse might be 
killed but the participant is not. The participant is protected and safe. 
Hence, it seems to me that we have two kinds of safety zones in the trolley 
problem. The first kind of safety zone is the place where the person who decides 
the direction of the trolley is situated, such as the place where a bystander or the 
driver is located in the original, simple trolley cases, and the place where Stimson 
and Truman were located in the case of Stimson’s interpretation of the dropping 
of atomic bombs. The second kind of safety zone is the place where people discuss 
the trolley problem such as classes in universities and venues of academic 
conferences, the place where a participant in questionnaire research is located, 
and the places the readers of this paper are located. I do not know where you are 
now, but that place must be a safety zone in this sense. We easily forget these two 
kinds of safety zones when discussing the trolley problem. This is the most 
important part of the third aspect of the problem of the trolley problem.  
 
The Fourth Aspect: “Possibility of Becoming a Victim” 
I discussed the problem of a safety zone in the previous section. You may say 
                                                     
17 Huebner and Hauser (2011), p.82. 
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the situation would be the same as in the case of the author of this paper, because 
the author is also in a safety zone, hence the author would never be immune from 
the above problems of the trolley problem. I think this might be correct in a sense, 
but the situation is not so simple. 
My father was on the Japanese main island when an atomic bomb was 
dropped on Hiroshima. At that time he was a college student living in a small city 
facing the Sea of Japan, to the northeast of Hiroshima city. If he had traveled to 
Hiroshima city, which was not unimaginable, or if the warplane carrying an 
atomic bomb had not been able to drop it on Hiroshima for some reason and 
continued flying to the northeast and dropped it on that small city, which was 
highly unlikely but not unimaginable, my father might have been killed, and as a 
result, I might not have been born.18 This shows, against our first guess, that the 
author of this paper might have been a person who was indirectly bound to a track, 
deprived of any freedom of choice, and placed under the threat of annihilation. 
The author might not have been inside a safety zone. 
If we enlarge this line of thought, it becomes clear that everyone who 
participates in the discussion of the trolley problem, including the reader of this 
paper, might have been a person who was at least indirectly bound to a track of 
some sort, deprived of any freedom of choice, and placed under the threat of 
annihilation, at some point in the past. And each of us might become such a person 
bound to a track at some point in the future. 
Although all of us might have been and might become the powerless victims 
of the event that contains the logic of the trolley problem, we are naturally and 
tactfully guided to discuss the problem solely from the perspective of a person 
who is on the side of choosing whether or not to turn the lever. This is the fourth 
aspect of the problem. 
 
The Fifth Aspect: “Lack of Perspective of the Dead Victims Who Were 
Deprived of Freedom of Choice” 
The trolley problem lacks the perspective of the people who are bound to the 
track, under threat to be killed, and deprived of any means to reach the lever. In 
the discussion of the trolley problem, we have many arguments and analyses made 
from the perspective of the driver or a bystander who is capable of deciding 
whether or not to turn the lever, but we can never hear the voices of people who 
                                                     
18 My mother was on the Korean peninsula at that time. 
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are ruthlessly bound to the track and deprived of their choices. Of course, in the 
trolley problem people on the track are surely taken into account, but they are 
incorporated into the discussion only as formal human lives to be saved or let die, 
not as flesh-and-blood people who are capable of thinking, having emotions, and 
having huge expectations about the choice that the person on the lever will make. 
I believe that this is a most essential problem of the trolley problem. I want to 
discuss this point more in detail. 
Let us see the discussion of the “Bystander’s Three Options” case and the 
“Driver’s Three Options” case in Thomson (2008) again. In these two cases, a 
bystander or the driver is under threat to be killed, because if she turns the lever 
to the left, the trolley is going to kill her, hence a flesh-and-blood person who is 
under threat on the driver’s seat or by the lever on the ground is incorporated into 
the discussion. However, there is a great difference between the situations of “the 
bystander or the driver” and “the people bound on to the track;” that is to say, of 
course both parties are under threat of being killed, but while the former has the 
freedom of choice about whether or not to turn the lever, the latter is completely 
deprived of such freedom. All the latter can do is continue to be bound to the track 
and just wait to see the result of the decision made by the former. We must say 
that in Thomson’s 2008 paper, although the perspective of the person who is going 
to be killed by her own decision-making is discussed in detail, the perspective of 
the people who are bound to the track and deprived of any freedom of choice is 
completely ignored. 
Let us take another example from Frances M. Kamm’s book, The Trolley 
Problem Mysteries. She discusses whether the relation between five people on the 
track and one person on the branch track might affect the distinction of the 
morality of killing and that of letting die, and calls this, “InterVictim 
Killing/Letting-Die Distinction.”19 The end-and-means relation is one example 
of what she has in mind when discussing this matter. If one person is killed on the 
branch track as a consequence of removing a threat to five, this killing is 
considered to be done as a side effect of the removal of the threat to other five, 
but if one person is killed as a result of toppling him to stop the trolley, this killing 
is considered to be done as “a mere means”20 to remove the threat to other five.21 
                                                     
19 Kamm (2015), p.73. 
20 Kamm (2015), p.75. 
21 This is not her original discussion in her book. She actually discusses three alternatives, in pages 
74-75, namely, killing five, killing two other people to save five, and killing a fat man to save five. 
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In these two cases, their inter-victim relations are utterly different. She tries to 
figure out whether this difference would make any effect on the permissibility of 
the acts done by the driver or a bystander. 
We should keep in mind that throughout her intricate and complicated 
discussion, what she tries to make clear is the morality of decision-making or the 
morality of action that the driver or a bystander would perform in front of the 
victims bound to the tracks, and how inter-victim relations would affect the 
morality of their decision-makings and their acts. The end point of her discussion 
lies on the driver/bystander side that enjoys the freedom of choice, not on the 
victim side that is deprived of that freedom. In this sense, we must say that 
although the perspective of victims is incorporated into her discussion as the 
relation between two victim parties, this perspective is used as a mere means to 
clarify the moral status of actions done by the driver or the bystander. She is 
standing on the driver/bystander side, not on the victim side, even when she 
discusses inter-victim relations. Here appears a typical characteristic of the 
discussion of the trolley problem. 
We should also pay attention to the hypothesis that victims are “bound to the 
tracks.” There are commentators saying that such settings are highly unusual and 
unrealistic; however, if we look at people’s lives in our society with unclouded 
eyes, we can see that there are many people who are actually bound to unwanted 
situations in their workplaces, homes, and living places, in terms of gender 
inequalities, economic disadvantages, and racial discrimination. Furthermore, 
many of those people cannot immediately rush away from their places for a 
number of reasons when they are suddenly faced with a huge threat, for example, 
a natural disaster, an economic crisis, mass violence or war. People are bound to 
an unwanted track for many reasons, and those who enjoy the freedom of choice 
often fail to see the situations that those who do not have such freedom are bound 
to. What binds people to the tracks is rarely talked about in the discussion of the 
trolley problem. The trolley problem is the problem for those who have freedom 
of choice by those who have such freedom. 
 
4. The Trolley Problem and Spirituality 
 
I have discussed five aspects of the problem of the trolley problem. These five 
aspects can be further simplified and rearranged, in terms of their key features, 
into a set of three groups: 
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Feature 1: The trolley problem often misguides us to believe that the events 
that contain the logic of the trolley problem in their decision-making 
processes rarely exist, and believe that even if such events should occur, the 
trolley’s brakes are broken, hence, it is inevitable for the trolley to rush into 
the victims. 
Feature 2: In the discussion of the trolley problem, it is very hard for us to 
be conscious of the privileges we enjoy at present—that is, the privileges 
that the freedom of choice is given to us and we are protected in a safety 
zone. It is very hard for us to imagine the possibility that we might have 
been deprived of such privileges in the past if the condition surrounding us 
had been different, and that we might lose them in the future if the condition 
surrounding us becomes different. 
Feature 3: In the discussion of the trolley problem, the perspective of the 
people who are bound to the track, deprived of freedom of choice, and 
under threat to be killed, is excluded and ignored. 
 
Then, how should we respond to these three features? 
In the first and the second features, the important aspects that we have to take 
into account when we discuss the trolley problem are placed out of our perspective 
and have disappeared from our sight.  
Concerning the first feature, what we have to do is to try to escape from such 
misbeliefs and to correct them every time we find them. This is our professional 
duty as researchers. 
Concerning the second feature, we have moral duty to enlarge our imagination 
to become aware of the privileges that we have at present and become aware of 
the possibilities that we might have been deprived of such privileges in the past 
and that we might lose them in the future, because it should be our moral duty, as 
human beings, to keep remembering the privileges we enjoy when we discuss the 
trolley problem. This is our inner duty. If we forget it, our thoughtlessness might 
become evident to the people surrounding us and disrupt their emotions. We have 
to take responsibility if we are accused of our thoughtlessness by someone, 
especially by those who once were the potential victims of the trolley problem, or 
by those who were the family or friends of the dead victims of the trolley problem. 
We have to take this point very seriously. Nevertheless, this does not mean that 
we have a moral duty to explicitly refer to these privileges and possibilities when 
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discussing the trolley problem. We have freedom to discuss the trolley problem 
without explicitly referring to the problem of the trolley problem no matter how 
ugly we may look to the surrounding audience, unless our words deeply hurt those 
who were potential victims or the loved ones of the dead victims. Moreover, if 
they come to us and say that they have gotten hurt, then we should stop our 
discussion and hear their voices carefully. This is our moral responsibility to them. 
Then, what about the third feature? Is there anything we can do to respond to 
it? As we have already pointed out, the trolley problem is established as a problem 
by excluding the perspective of the people who are bound to the track and under 
threat to be killed. Once we incorporate that perspective, the trolley problem will 
inevitably change into something that is completely different from the trolley 
problem. Inside the paradigm of the trolley problem, we can never see the 
situation from the perspective of the people being bound to the tracks and deprived 
of freedom of choice, because the trolley problem is a problem about who we kill, 
not about what those who are under threat to be killed would think. 
Does this mean we cannot do anything to respond to the third feature when 
discussing the trolley problem? I do not think so. I would like to propose to move 
away from the level of ethics and proceed on the level of spirituality. 
I have friends whose parents or relatives were exposed to radiation in 
Hiroshima or Nagasaki. Some of them have survived but others died soon after 
the blast. Every time I hear the discussion of the trolley problem I cannot help 
imagining what the dead victims of atomic bombs would feel if they also listened 
to the discussion in our seminar room. I think they would feel very sad and 
irritated to know the fact that the perspectives of the dead victims are excluded 
and the victim’s voices are never reflected in their discussion. 
I used the term ‘spirituality’ above. The reason for this is that the third feature 
is closely connected to our spiritual relationships with dead people who fell victim 
to the events that contained the logic of the trolley problem and died in grief and 
chagrin. Everywhere in the world, when someone is killed ruthlessly on the street, 
people get together and lay flowers on the ground. This is because they still 
continue to have spiritual relationships with the dead person even after the person 
disappeared from this world. They lay flowers to show that the living does not 
forget the grief and chagrin of the dead, to pray that such a tragedy will never 
happen again, and to send their words of condolence to the dead, imagining as if 
the dead person were still alive and listened to their words. Not only religious 
people but also non-religious people share this attitude. This way of reacting is 
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truly transcultural. Spirituality here does not mean that of a specific religion. By 
the word “spirituality” I mean the dimension on which the living perform a kind 
of dialogue with the memory of the dead, or with the traces of the dead, or with 
the voices we hear from the dead. When we lay flowers on the ground or on the 
cemetery we sometimes murmur a word to the non-existing other. This is the 
dimension of spirituality I am talking about here in this context. 
I believe that those who talk about the trolley problem are automatically 
placed in the sphere of the “expectation of response on the spiritual level,” and in 
this sphere, they are expected to respond something spiritual to our memory of 
the dead victims who were killed in the events that contained the logic of the 
trolley problem in their decision-making processes.  
What kind of response we are to make is completely up to us. Putting our 
hands together and praying before a discussion might be one way of responding 
to the expectation. Laying flowers on a place associated with the event before 
going to the venue of discussion might be another way of responding. Just adding 
words of commemoration in one’s presentation, or simply imagining the suffering 
of the victims in one’s head before presentation might work as an act of 
responding. The way of responding does not necessarily need to become public 
to an audience. The important thing is that those who talk have an intention to 
respond to the memory of the dead victims in some way or another. If they have 
such intentions, their inner emotions are naturally conveyed to the audience 
through their unconscious words and attitudes. In this sense, we can say that their 
spiritual responses are being carefully watched by the people who are listening to 
the speakers’ presentations. 
Let us take a closer look at the central point. When a speaker in front of an 
audience conducts a thought experiment in which the death of a person or persons 
inevitably happens, the speaker is encouraged to examine her thought experiment 
from the following perspectives. 
 
1) Whether or not the actual events that contained the logic of her thought 
experiment occurred in the past. 
2) Whether or not the voices of dead victims in the past actual events are 
ignored or sanitized in her thought experiment. 
3) Whether or not the speaker believes that it is necessary to perform her 
thought experiment in such a sanitized way. 
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If all the answers to the above three questions are yes, then the speaker is 
automatically placed in the sphere of the “expectation of response on the spiritual 
level,” and whether and how to respond to this expectation is all left to the speaker. 
Her response is to be silently watched by an audience. This logic is applied not 
only to the trolley problem, but also other thought experiments that contain the 
inevitable killing of someone. The “expectation of response on the spiritual level” 
is not the topic peculiar to the trolley problem, and I think that even if the speaker 
does not know, because of her ignorance, the fact that the events that contained 
the logic of the thought experiment existed in the past, even then, she is to be 
automatically placed in the sphere of the expectation all the same. This way of 
reasoning might sound very harsh to us, but this is one of the important points I 
want to emphasize in this paper. 
It should be noted that ignoring this expectation and performing no responses 
to the memory of the dead victims may cause a grave problem on the spiritual 
level. Honestly speaking, I felt a sense of disgust when I first heard the discussion 
of the trolley problem at a philosophy conference. The main reason was probably 
that I could not find any (verbal or nonverbal) responses on the spiritual level in 
the lively discussion on the trolley problem. At that time I was not be able to put 
that feeling into words, but now I can verbalize it in this way. 
I want to once again stress that we do not have any “moral duty” to respond 
to the expectation, because this is the matter of “spirituality,” not the matter of 
“morality.” However, the important thing to remember is that our reaction is 
always being watched by our others, both inside and outside the community, and 
perhaps, by our memory of the dead people who reside in the heart of every one 
of us. 
It might still be hard to understand the concept of the response on the spiritual 
level. Let me show one impressive example. After World War II, a monument that 
commemorates the victims of the atomic bomb was built at ground zero of 
Hiroshima city. On the monument, the following text was inscribed: “Let all the 
souls here rest in peace; for we shall not repeat the evil.”22 This is an oath not to 
repeat such a tragic war again in the future. The word “we” means not only people 
in Hiroshima city, but also all human beings on earth, including the entire 
Japanese and US citizenry. The creators of this message intended to convey these 
words to the memory of the dead victims of the atomic bomb, in other words, to 
                                                     
22 Hiroshima city’s webpage: http://www.city.hiroshima.lg.jp/shimin/heiwa/q7e.html (Visited May 3, 
2016). 
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the people who would have lived there if the atomic bomb had not been dropped 
on that summer day. This was a message arising from the relationship between 
the Hiroshima citizens who survived the atrocity and their dead residents. This is 
one example of the response on the spiritual level performed seven years after the 
dropping of the atomic bomb. 
It was impressive that when the then US president Barak Obama first visited 
Hiroshima on May 27, 2016, the atomic bomb survivors attending the ceremony 
did not ask him to apologize. Instead, they were sitting silently, listening to every 
translated word, carefully watching every movement of his countenance, and 
trying to read the president’s inner intentions and emotions. I believe that what 
they were expecting first of all was not a response on the level of morality, but a 
response on the level of spirituality, that is, a spiritual response to the memory of 
the dead victims who were killed by the US atomic bombs 70 years ago. 
Of course, in the course of human history, there has been innumerable grief 
and chagrin associated with man-made killings or allowing death on both a large 
scale and a small scale. Hiroshima and Nagasaki are no more than just two 
examples of them. What we have to do is to enlarge our imagination when talking 
about thought experiments like the trolley problem, and to think about the 
possibility of our spiritual responses to the dead victims who were killed by past 
events similar to those thought experiments. 
Seeing my argument from a different angle, we could also say the following. 
If you had been a person who participated in the construction of the atomic bombs, 
you would have felt a sense of condolence toward the bombing victims after 
seeing the pictures of ground zero. Or if you learned the stories of victims who 
died soon after the blast in unbearable pain, you would have the same feeling 
towards them. These are natural responses to the dead victims on a spiritual level 
when we know the reality of such a tragedy. My argument is that not only such 
people, but also those who perform a sanitized thought experiment, in which the 
voices of the people under threat to be killed are ignored and dismissed, are 
automatically placed in the sphere of the “expectation of response on the spiritual 
level.” This is one of the most important claims I have made in this paper. 
I have said that we do not have moral duty to respond to the dead victims on 
the spiritual level, but this does not mean that we are free from the discussion of 
the morality of dropping atomic bombs. There are philosophers, although not 
majority, who doubt Truman-Stimson’s type of justification. For example, 
Elizabeth Anscombe argues that the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and 
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Nagasaki were considered to be murders because a very large number of innocent 
people were killed “all at once, without warning, without the interstices or the 
chance to take shelter, which existed even in the ‘area bombings’ of the German 
cities.” 23  John Rawls argues that “both Hiroshima and the fire-bombing of 
Japanese cities were great evils…. An invasion was unnecessary at that date, as 
the war was effectively over.”24  Japanese philosopher Toshiro Terada, while 
basically agreeing with their criticisms on the dropping, points out that some of 
their arguments are based on the wrong assumptions; hence, such mistakes have 
to be corrected.25 I believe that the mass killing of small children and babies by 
the dropping of atomic bombs should not be justified. Ronald Takaki quotes 
Truman’s words: “My object is to save as many American lives as possible but I 
also have a humane feeling for the women and children in Japan.” 26  The 
philosophical discussion of the morality of the dropping of atomic bombs has not 
been settled, and hence, should be continued more vigorously than ever in the 
future. 
Finally, I will summarize the main points of this paper here. First, I showed 
that the dropping of atomic bombs was a typical example of the events that 
contained the logic of the trolley problems in their decision-making processes and 
justifications; second, I discussed five aspects of the problem of the trolley 
problem in detail; and third, I argued that those who talk about the trolley problem 
are automatically placed in the sphere of the expectation of response on the 
spiritual level. 
I hope that my contribution will shed light on the trolley problem from a very 
different angle that has not been made by our fellow philosophers. 
 
* I would like to offer sincere condolences to the victims of atomic bombs 
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and to other victims around the world who died 
or were killed in events that contained the logic of the trolley problem in 
their decision-making processes, and hereby strongly hope that such 
atrocities will never be repeated in the future. 
 
  
                                                     
23 Anscombe (1957), p.64. 
24 Rawls (1995), p.326. 
25 Terada (2010). 
26 Takaki (1995), p.329. 
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